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Abstract 
The notion of context and its importance in knowledge representation and non-
monotonic reasoning was first discussed in Artificial Intelligence by John McCarthy. 
Ever since, contexts have found many applications in developing knowledge-based 
reasoning systems. 
Defeasible argumentation has gained wide acceptance within the Al community 
in the last years. Different argument-based frameworks have been proposed. In this 
respect, MTDR (Simari & Loui, 1992) has come to be one of the most successful. 
However, even though the formalism is theoretically sound, there exist sorne dialec-
tical considerations involving argument construction and the inference mechanism, 
which impose a rather procedural approach, tightly interlocked with the system's 
logic. 
This paper discusses different uses of contexts for modelling the process of de-
feasible argumentation. We present an alternative view of MTDR using contexts. 
Our approach will allow us to discuss novel issues in MTDR, such as defining a set 
of moves and introducting an arbiter for regulating inference. As a result, protocols 
for argument generation as well as some technical considerations for speeding up 
inference will be kept apart from the logical machinery underlying MTDR. 
lSupported by a fellowship oí the Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CON-
ICET), República Argentina. 
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On the use of contexts forrepresenting knowledge 
in defeasible argumentation 
1 Introduction and motivations 
An argumentative system [11, 13] is a formalization of the process of defeasible reasoning. 
Arguments are tentative pieces of reasoning an intelligent agent would be inclined to ac-
cept, aH things considered, as an explanation for a given hypothesis. Given an argument 
A for a hypothesis h, the presence of counterarguments for A causes it to become weak-
ened, and A may no longer be regarded as acceptable. However A may be reínstated ií 
further counter-counterarguments appear. The final a,cceptance of the argument A as a 
justífied reason for explaining h will result írom a recursive procedure, in which arguments, 
counterarguments, counter-counterarguments, and so on, must be taken into account. 
Argument-based systems have drawn the attention oí the Al community during the 
last years. In that respect, many alternative íormalizations have been proposed. In A 
Mathematícal Treatment of Defeasíble Reasoning [11], or MTDR, a elear and theoretically 
sound structure for an argument-based reasoning system was Íntroduced. On this basis, 
some interesing results have been obtained, which in elude the development of argument-
based expert systems and an extension of the original framework for incorporating TMS-
facilities through an arguments base [3]. A conceptuaHy improved version oí the original 
framework based on dialectical considerations has been presented in [10]. 
The resulting íramework for defeasible reasoning involves two aspects: on th~ one 
hand, defining what is supposed to be a proof (namely, the notion of justification). On the 
other hand, stating the way in which proofs are obtained through a dialectical procedure, 
which comes to be interlocked with the logical machinery underlying .MTDR. 
The notion of context and its application in knowledge representation and defea-
sible reasoning was first discussed by McCarthy in informal drafts. In R.V.Guha's 
Ph.D.Thesis [5] (under McCarthy's direction), this issue was studied in depth, and rel-
evant contributions for actual Al applications were presented. Guha's main motivation 
was indeed the development of the Cyc system, a task which seemed to be intractable 
without contexts as a íormalization tool. Logical properties of contexts have been recently 
established, and they have turned into a powerful tool for improving existing formalisms 
for nonmonotonic reasoning. McCarthy has discussed some issues about contexts froID a 
philosophical point of view [8]. The notion of context itself seems to be rather ellusive. In 
his own words " ... it seems to me unlikely that this study will result in a unique conclusion 
about what a context ís. Instead, as usual in Al, various notions will be found useful." , 
This paper discusses some uses of contexts as a formalization tool in defeasible ar-
gumentation. We will follow McCarthy's suggestion, using contexts from a particular 
viewpoint which comes out to be useful for our purposes. We will restate some oId defini-
tions from MTDR, and introduce new ones. Some of the basic elernents for context-based 
argurnentation were originally introduced in [12]. In this paper, sorne of those definitions 
have been refined, and sorne new concepts are incorporated. 
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We are not pursuing a context-based system equivalent in expressiveness to MTDR. 
Instead, we want to integrate both declarative and procedural issues into a unifying frame-
work, so that dialectical procedures and MTDR's underlying logic can be kept aparto In 
order to do so, we will use contexts. 
2 Contexts as formalization tools in Al 
The concept of context was first discussed in Al by McCarthy, and in several informal 
drafts. The first in-depth study of contexts was carried out by Guha [5]. Eversince, 
the Al community has also accepted the need to consider contexts when transferring 
information among intelligent agents. Logical properties of contexts, such as soundness 
and completeness results, have been also established. Next we will discuss sorne basic 
notions about contexts (for a complete treatment of this subject, see [5]). Contexts are 
"rich objects" in the domain of a theory. Contextual effects on an expression may be so 
rich that they cannot be captured in the scope oí a logic. This leads us to in elude contexts 
as objects in our ontology. 
In order to incorporate contexts into our framework, we will extend a classic first-
order language L to inelude wffs of the form ist(C,F), whereF is a wff of L, and e is 
the name of the context, and ist(C,F) stands for 'F is true in context C. The context 
symbol e is supposed to capture any assumption that is not in F, but is required to 
make F a meaningful statement. The semantics oí L is also extended for interpreting 
the sentence ist(C,F) as a wff of the language. Logical connectives such as A, V, and ..., 
preserve their traditional meaning. The idea is that F might depend on sorne contextual 
aspects that have not (yet) been specified, and these aspects are to be captured by the 
context argumento It might not be possible ever to list completely al1 oí these context 
dependencies. At any time, we might have only a partial description oí the context and 
this is why contexts are assumed to be rich objects. In that respect, Guha [5] says that 
"the context object can be thought oí as the reification oí the context dependencies oí the 
sentences associated with the context". Sorne oí the most relevant íeatures oí contexts 
are: 
• A context-based system is assumed to be always in sorne contexto It is possible to 
change the context the system is in, by entering a new contexto The inverse action 
is exiting. 
• A context-based íramework also in eludes lifting rules, which relate different contexts. 
Lifting rules can be thought oí as having the form holds( Gi , s) ~ holds( Gil s), 
meaning "if sentence s is known to hold in context Gi , it will also hold in context 
G· " J' 
• There is always an outermost context associatedwith a system. This outermost 
context may be trascended, and a new outermost context could be introduced. This 
might be seen as equivalent to introducing one meta..:level higher than was previously 
available. We will íurther consider this notion in section 4. 
Next, we will discuss how to embed the MTDR íramework for deíeasible argumentation 
into a context-based system. 
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3 Context-based defeasible argumentation 
3.1 MTDR: a brief overview 
We will rephrase the main ideas behind our argumentative framework (the reader is 
referred to [11] for further details, and to the appendix for basic definitions). 
Firstly, we say that an argument A will be accepted as a defeasible reason for a con-
clusion h if A is a justification for h. The acceptance of the original argument A as a 
justification for h will result from a recursive procedure, in which arguments, counterar-
guments, counter-counterarguments, and so on, should be taken into account. This leads 
to a tree structure, called dialectical tree. 2 Paths along that tree will be called argumen-
tatíon lines, which can be thought of alternate sequences of supporting and interfering 
arguments in a dehate. However,it may he the case that an argumentation Hne contains 
contradictory supporting (interfering) arguments, or that it does not convey any progress 
in the process of finding a justification. This results in cycles along an argumentatíon 
Hne, which result in fallacious argumentation [3], and therefore should be avoided. This 
leads us to the notion of acceptable argumentation lineo As expected, only dialectical trees 
huilt from acceptable argumentation lines will be accepted as valido An argument (A, h) 
will he considered to he a justification for h iff there exists an acceptable dialectical tree 
for (A, h). 
3.2 MTDR within contexts3 
According to the definitions presented in [12], the construction of a dialectical tree Cél,n be 
seen as a debate 4between two parties: a proponent (prop) and an opponent (opp). The 
proponent rnust defend a given claim, either by advancing supporting arguments or by 
defeating previous interfering arguments. The opponent must outweigh the evidence pre-
sented by the proponent, advancing arguments which interfere the supporting arguments 
advanced so faro Party will denote either of the two parties, and Party will denote the 
adversary of Party. 
We will associate the debate process with two kind of contexts. On the one hand, there 
will he a context for both proponent and opponent (denoted Gprop and Gopp , respectively). 
The context GParty will be related to assertions of the form ist( GParty, argumente (Al, h1 )), 
standing for "Party supports (All hl }". On the other hand, we will capture the su ces-
sive stages in the process of debate through so-called debate contexts, which are basically 
'snapshots' of the arguments in conflict advanced so faro New debate contexts will be 
entered in whenever sorne party introduces an argument in a debate that defeats another. 
Debate contexts will be numbered Go, Gl , ... , Gn . Every debate context will be related 
to an assertion ist(G¡,defeats(A,B» (standing for "Argument A defeats argument B in 
context G;") and assertions of the form ist(G¡,state(Arg,State)), which stands for "Ar-
gument Arg is in condition State in context G;". State may be "!" (stands for alíve or 
undefeated) or "t" (stands for dead or defea.ted), respectively. 
2See [10] for a formal definition. 
3See [12] for a more complete discussion of the basic definitions presented here. 
4See (9, 10] for details. 
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3.2.1 M oves 
The outermost debate context can be seen as the current stage in the process of debate, 
so that it should be assocÍated with all relevant information for further argumentation. 
The moves performed by both parties in order to carry out the debate will be based on 
the information in the current debate context, as well as on arguments in Cprop and Copp • 
There are several kinds of moves that could be defined. In [12], a basic set of two moves 
(assertion and attack) was introduced. We will now extend that set to four moves. The 
motivations for doing so are discussed below. 
• Assertion: Party can just assert an argument (A, h), incorporating it into its set 
CParty of arguments. 
• Attack: Party can attack Party by advancing an argument from CParty which 
defeats one of the Party's arguments present in the current debate context Ccv.rrent. 
• Retraction: Party can retract an argument advanced in a previous assert or attack 
move. 
• Concession: Party may concede Party the acceptance of an argument advanced 
in a previous assert or attack move. 
The first two moves allow parties to carry on a debate; however, this seems insuffi.-
ciento In order to get a more natural model of dialectical interaction, parties should be 
allowed to retract arguments which seem deemed to be defeated or considered irrelevant 
for the debate. We must keep in mind that parties are not allowed to introduce neithel' 
contradictory nor circular arguments as the debate proceeds.5 Performing a wrong move 
m should not force a party to support m for the rest of the debate. Retracting m seems 
therefore to be a reasonable solution. 
On the other hand, it might be the case that sorne party finds out that one of the 
arguments advanced by the other party cannot be defeated for sorne reason (because of its 
strength, lack of computational resources, etc.). In that case, one party should be able to 
concede the other the acceptance of the argument at issue. That would simplify fnrther 
moves in the debate, since parties would no longer disagree about the conclusion supported 
by that argumento This has sorne interesting implications, which may considerably affect 
the size of the search space (see section 4 for further details). 
3.2.2 Sorne context-based inference rules 
Next we will briefly describe a set of inference rules for modeling the process of performing 
defeasible argumentation within MTDR using the moves mentioned above.6 
5See [10] for the formal definition of contradictory and circular argumentation. 
6See [12] for details. 
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Rule 1: [K U A r- h] [K U A ~.1] [,llA' e A, K U A' r- h] 
(A,h) 
Rule 2: (A, h) 
ist(CParty, argument«(A,h») 1\ ist(Co, state«(A,h),!» 
Rule 3: ist(CParty, argument«(A¡,h1}» ist(Cparty,(A2,h2}) 
[(A}, h1 }> def(A2, h2 }] ist( Gi, state( (A:o, hÚ,!» 
Rule 4: ¡st( CParty, argumente (Al, h1}» 
ist( Cparty' argumente (A¡, h1)) 
Rule 5: ¡st(C¡, defeats«(A},hl },(A2 ,h2 }» 
ist(C¡, state({A},h1},!» 1\ ist(G¡, state«(A2 ,h2 ),t) 
Rule 6: ist(G¡,state«(A1,h¡},!» notist(C¡, defeats«(A2 ,h2 ),(A¡,h1)) 
ist(G"ucc(i),state«(A¡,h l },!» 
Through rule 1 we state when it is valid to construct a given argument.7 Rules 2 
and 3 define valid moves, namely assertions (rule 2) and attacks (rule 3). In order to 
assert an argument, a party must just be able to construct it from (JC, L\). An attack can 
be performed only on those arguments currently alive asserted by the other party, and 
it involves the introduction of a new debate contexto Rule 4 stands for the concession 
movej either of the two parties can incorporate sorne of the other party's argument into 
its associated contexto Rule 5 establishes the consequence of a defeat relation between 
two arguments (the defeater is alive, and the defeated argument is dead). Rule 6 states 
how to lift arguments alive in previous debate contexts into the current debate contexto 
The sentence notist(C,s) stands for "ist(C,s) does not hold". 
Retracting an argument (Al) h1) basically involves eliminating the argument from 
CPartYl and introducing a new debate context, which properly reflects the current situation 
of the arguments involved in the debate. That new debate context could be the result of 
applying sorne kind of belief revision operator on the current debate context.s 
As a debate is carried out, sorne arguments turn out to be reinstated, and can be 
lifted into the current debate contexto These arguments can be identified through the línk 
relation. (This process has been described in detail in [12]). Links are transitive, and 
linked arguments preserve their "aliveness" within a given argumentation lineo Linked 
arguments can be thus reinstated into the current debate contexto There were two situ-
ations to be avoided because of dialectical considerations, namely circular reasoning and 
contradictory argumentation [10]. Links allow us to specify rules that behave as con-
straints for the inference process, leading to inconsistency whenever the moves are not 
performed within these constraints. 
7Premises enclosed in brackets mean that they can only be derived from the basic definitions of 
argument, counterargument and defeat. 
8The definition of that operator is currently being studied. The retract move is thus presented rather 
infol'mally, as (.1. natural extension for an argument-based framework, as stated in [4, 1]. It must be 
remarked that retracting arguments is not present in MTDR. 
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3.2.3 Exhaustive debates 
A debate is basically a finite sequence {mI, m2, m3, ... , m n }, where each mi is a pair with 
the form (Party, Move). If the first move in a debate d is asserting an argument (A, h), 
we will say that d is a debate about h. 
A debate can be understood as sucessive applic.ations of the inference rules given 
aboye. Let (K,~) be a knowledge base. Let d = {mI, m2, ... , mk} be a debate about a 
claim h, based on (K, ~). We will say that a sentence s is outcome of the debate d iff s 
can be consistently derived from (K,~) by application of the inference rules associated 
with mIl m2, ... , mk. Since we are mainly interested in knowing whether the claim h is 
supported ornot, we will restrict ourselves to the current debate contexto 
DEFINITION 3.1 Let C¡ be the current debate context when performing a debate about 
a given claim h. Then the set of all sentences assocÍated with Ci will be called the current 
outcome of the debate. 
We are specially interested in those debates in which no further moves can he per-
formed which affect the current outcome. This kind of debates will be called exhaustive 
debates. The notion of justification will be then characterized in terms of exhaustive 
debates. 
DEFINITION 3.2 Let d = {mb m2, ... , md be a debate about a claim h. We will say 
that d is exhaustive iff it is no longer possible to perform applications of inference rules 
changing the current outcome. 
It must be remarked that the finallabeling of the root no de in a dialectical tree does 
not depend from the way the tree was obtained,9 since the number of arguments involved 
is finite, and in the long run the "better" (most specific) arguments will prevail. This 
prompts an alternative definition of justification set in this framework: 
DEFINITION 3.3 An argument (A, h) is a justification in for h íf there exists an exhaustive 
debate d about the claim h in which ist( Ccurrent,state( (A, h) ,!)) is one oí its outcomes. 
4 Metalevel facilities provided by contexts 
Metalevel reasoning seems to be a natural issue in defeasible argumentation, particularly 
in conection with frameworks for legal argumentation. A debate between proponent and 
opponent may be arbitered by a third party (the arbiter),t° which analizes the confronta-
tion arnong arguments 'from the outside', and solves different metalevel problerns. Among 
those tasks to be performed by the arbiter, we can mention the following: 
• Establishing whether the debate protocol is being correctly followed; 
• Deciding current course of action on the basis of previous debates; 
9This can be inferred from the inductive definition of justification given in [11]. 
lOCalled determiner or judge in other approaches. 
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• Determining whether the debate should be ended because of sorne particular reason 
(resources exhausted, time-out settings, etc.). 
In this respect, it is interesting to recall an important feature of contexts, namely the 
notion of trascendence [8]: 
Human intelligence involves an ability that no-one has yet undertaken to put in computer 
programs, namely the ability to trascend the context of one's beliefs. [ ... ] In fact, this ability 
is required for something less than full intelligence. We need it to be able to comprehend 
someone else's discovery even if we can't make the discovery ourselves. 
McCarthy wants to exploit the notion of transcendence based on the fact that there 
always exists an implicit outer contexto From the fact that a sentence p is true, for 
example, our intelligent agent should be able to infer ist( Co,p), where cO stands for the 
agent 's outer contexto Actually, this operation couId be performed severaI times, resultíng 
in new outer contexts C-l, C-2, and so on. Finally, McCarthy points out that the usefulness 
of trascendence will depend on having a suitable collection of rules for lifting sentences to 
the higher level contexts. 
4.1 A third party in a debate: the arbiter 
In order to define the role of the arbiter in a debate, we can also use context-based inference 
rules, involving sentences such as ist( Carbiter, ist( C ,8)), where C stands for a context (such 
as CParty), and s stands for a particular sentence. Consider for example formalizing the 
fact that "the arbiter should know every argument presented by the proponent",tI This 
can be easily done through the rule 
ist( CprOE' argumente (Ab h1)) 
ist( CarbiteTl argumente (Ab hl }» 
The arbiter may even possess knowledge which trascends the knowledge of the parties 
involved. In this respect, it is interesting to consider the notion of commitment store. 
We know both proponent and opponent share a common knowledge base, i.e., they are 
commited to accept certain beliefs (e.g. those derived from K,). However, di alectical 
considerations also impose a set of "shared" knowledge as the debate is carried out. That 
set will be called commitment 8tore. 
Consider the following situation: the proponent introduces a given argument (Al, h1 ) 
in a debate, the opponent counterargues by introducing a new argument (A2 , h2 ). How-
ever, both arguments may have sorne subarguments in common (i.e., the opponents con-
cedes sorne inner literals in (Ab h1 ), but still rejects its conclusion). Up to that point., 
subarguments in cornrnon between (A¡, h1 ) and (A2 , h2 ) are no longer argueable within 
that argumentation lineo We can capture this concept by introducing a new context, 
called Ccommit, for representing information both parties are commited to as the debate 
proceeds. The information in Ccommit would result from the application of the following 
inference rule: I 
llOf course, the same rule should apply also fOI opponent. I 
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ist(Ccurrent, state«(All h1},!» ist(Ccurrent. state«(A2,h2},!» C= Al n A 2 
ist( CPart1l' argument( (Al, hl}» ist( Cpartu' argument( (A2 , h2 }» 
ist( Ccommit, argument( (C, h) » 
The information in C is basically a set of grounded defeasible rules, whose conclusions does 
not necessarily belong to JC. However, we know that those literals should not be further 
counterargumentation points, for the reasons mentioned aboye. The arbiter should then 
consider the inner literals supported by those "arguments in common" under the saine 
epistemic status as the one associated with ground facts derivable from JC. Thus,· the 
arbiter could hold his own set of beliefs within his associated context according to the 
following rules: 
ist( Ccommit, argument( (A, h)) 
ist( C arbiter, a rgu ment( (A, h) » 
[JC 1- s] 
ist( Carbiter ,8) 
The commitment store may be best enlarged by conceding arguments. Whenever 
sorne party concedes an argument (All hl ) to the other party, all ground defeasible rules 
in (Al, hl ) should be incorporated into the cornmitment store, since both parties agree on 
every inner literal in (Al, hl ). 
It must be observed that the previous analysis leads to important computational sav-
ings when considering implementation issues. Computing arguments is particularly ex-
pensive in MTDR, since it involves performing exhaustive search on the knowledge base. 
The structural resemblance oí argument and counterargument would help simplify the 
specificity checking, by eliminating the analysis on literals supported by both argument 
and counterargument. Exploiting inference rule as those stated aboye could result in 
a sorted dialectical tree, in which the shortest argumentation lines are built as soon as 
possible (see [2]). 
4.2 Defining debate protocols 
Defining a proper debate protocol is a particularly important issue in defeasible argu-
mentation. A protocol establisheshow the parties engaged in the debate aregoing to 
interact. Some aspects of protocols involve defining when an argument deíeats. another, 
when termination is appropiate, etc. As R. Loui observes [6], protocols have been under-
estimated in nonmonotonic reasoning because resource-bounds "are not taken seriously", 
and considered to be associated with search strategies and implementation features. Loui 
contends that formal study of protocol is needed íor nonmonotonic reasoning. He states 
that "policies without processes have no meaning"and "íor policies, protocol is semantics". 
A context-based framework as the one presented in this paper provides interesting 
features for defining protocols on the basis of the set of inference rules. We can easily 
specify particular constraints on the process of debate, by changing or modifying the 
set oí inference rules. The most intereating feature is perhaps the possibili,ty of defining 
protocols by demanding closure with respect to sorne particular inference rule. Thus, for 
example, every party might be enforced to introduce all possible arguments for supporting 
a given claim before attacking some of the arguments introduced by the other party" We 
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must recall that a debate is a tree-like structure. By demanding closure with respect to 
attacks, we would be working on a depth-first basis; by demanding closure with respect 
to constructing all possible arguments, we would be working on a breadth-first basis. 
Where is protocol to be defined? We consider this to be an open issue. It seems natural 
that the arbiter be the one who enforces the application of certain rules. Thus, protocols 
could be defined within the arbiter's contexto However, the role of the arbiter itself might 
be part oí the protocol, so that a new context trascending the arbiter's context, could 
be introduced. The context-based framework presented in this paper is properly suited 
for being further extended and considering metalevel facilities as the protocol definition, 
arbiter's role, etc. 
5 Conclusions and future work 
We contend that the formalization presented in this paper offers an alternative approach 
to defeasible argumentation using MTDR. We have presented a unifying framework for 
defining the different elements used in performing defeasible argumentation. On the one 
hand, we introduced several context names for capturing the information associated with 
different situations. Then, we presented a set of context-based inference rules for defining 
the process of inference in our framework. These rules basically relate the information 
associated with different contexts. 
The use of contexts provided an useful formalization tool for distinguishing declarative 
from procedural features within MTDR. As a rcsult, different protocols for defeasible 
argumentation can be defined, depending on the set of inference rules defined, as well as 
the preference criteria for deciding the order under which the rules are to be evaluated. 
The set of moves presented in this paper is related to other argument-based approaches, 
such as Gordon's [4] and Brewka's [1], and extends considerably the MTDR framework. 
The work of Brewka is particularly significant, since it constitutes the first 'direct step 
forward in nearly two decades' [7] from the non-monotonic reasoning cornmunity into di-
alectics. Brewka considers disputation as the process of constructing a default theory the 
proponent and opponent agree upon. We think that interesting connections can be drawn 
between performing a debate within MTDR and building default theories as described 
aboye. Brewka himself finds useful to explore the relationships among game theoretic 
models of argumentation and nonmonotonic reasoning, when aiming at applications in-
volving multiple agents. 
There are still many issues to be solved in defeasible argumentation, and a lot of 
questions remain open. Having an adequate formalism for defining protocols is one of 
them [6]. Even though we know that there is still much work ahead, we hope that the 
results discussed in this paper be a useful contribution in that direction. 
A The MTDR framework 
In this appendix, we will briefly describe the main concepts of the MTDR framework. For a compJete 
description, see [11]. 
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A.l Knowledge representation 
The knowledge of an intelligent agent A will be represented using a first-order language e, plus a binary 
meta-linguistic relation ">-", defined on e, between a set of nonground literals (antecedent) and a 
nonground literal (consequent) which share variables. The members of this meta-linguistic relation will 
be caHed defeasible rules. The relation "a >- f3 " is understood as expressing that "reasons to believe 
in the antecedent a provide reasons to believe in the consequent f3". We will restrict the first-order 
language e to a subset involving only Rom clauses. 
The set K will be a consistent subset of e representing the non-defeasible part of A's knowledge. A 
is a finite set of nonground defeasible rules representing information that A is prepared to take at less 
than face value. If A ~ A, we will denote as Al the set of aH ground instances oí members oí A. 
The set K can be partitioned into two subsets: KG (general knowledge) and Kp (particular or 
contingentknowledge). Sentences in Kp will be ground literals (E.g.: flies(tweety), penguin(opus» which 
do not appear as consequents of rules in KG or A, since they represent basic input information sensored 
by A, from which new information can be inferred. Sentences in KG will be material implications having 
the form al, a2, ... , a",-+b, e.g. penguin(X)-+bird(X). Defeasible rules have the form al,a2, .. ' ,a", >- b, 
e.g. bird(X) >- flies(X). 
A.2 Inference 
In arder to make this paper self-contained, we present next definitions A.l through A.B, which surnmarize 
the notion of inference in MTDR (for a complete definition of this framework, see [11]). 
DEFINITION A.l Let r be a subset of K U Al. A ground literal h is a defeasible consequence of r, 
abbreviated r r- h, ir and only if there exists a finite sequence Bl, ... , Bn such that Bn = h and for 
1 ~ i < n, either Bi E r, or Bi is a direct consequence of the preceding elements in the sequence by virtue 
of tbe application oí any iníerence rule oí the first-order theory assocÍated with the language e. Ground 
instan ces of the deíeasible rules are regarded as material implications íot the application of iníerence 
rules. We will write K U A r- h distinguishing the set A of defeasible rules used in the derivation froro 
the set K. 
DEFINITION A.2 Given a set K, a set A oí defeasible rules, and a ground literal h in the language e, 
we say that a subset A oí Al is an argument structure (or just argument) for h in the context K (denoted 
by (A, h)K, or just (A, h» if and only if: 1) K U A r- h, 2) K U A ~.l and 3) ,lIA' e A, K U A' r- h. 
A subargument of (A, h) is an argument (S, j) such that S ~ A. 
DEFINITION A.3 Given twoarguments (Al,h l ) and (A2,h2), wesaythat (Al,hl ) counterargues(A2,h2}, 
h 
denoted (Al, hl)~ (A2, h2) iff there exists a subargument (A, h) of (A2, h2) such that K U {h,1, h2} 1- .l. 
The literal h will be called a counterargumentation literal. 
DEFINITION A.4 Let V = {a E e: a is a ground literal and KU~r- a}, and let(Al,hl ) and (A2,h2) 
be two argument structures. We say that Al for hl is strictly more specific than A 2 for h2 , denoted 
(Al> hl) >-spec (A2 , h2 ), if and only if 
i)VS~V ifKGUSUAlr-- hlandKGUS~ h l ,thenKG USUA2 r- h2 • 
ii)3S~V suchthatKGUSUA2r- h2,KGUS~ h2 andKGUSU Al~ hl . 
DEFINITION A.S Given two argument structures (Al,hl ) and (A2,h2), we say that (A¡,hl) defeats 
(A2, h2) at literal h, denoted (Al, hl ) ~ def(A2, h2}, if and only if there exists a subargument (A, h) oí 
(A2, h2) such that: (Al, hl ) counterargues (A2, h2 ) at the literal h and 
1. (Al, hl ) is strictly more specificl2 than (A, h), or 2. (Al, hl ) is unrelated by specificity to (A, h). 
If (Al, hl ) ~ def(A2, h2), we will also say that (Al, hl ) is a defeaterfor (A2, h2). In case (1) (Al, hl ) will 
be caHed a proper defeater, and in case (2) ablocking defeater. 
l2We use specificity as comparison criterion, but any otber partial arder among arguments might be 
possible. 
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DEFINITION A.6 A dialectical tree 1(A, h) for an argument (A, h) is recursively defined as follows: 
1. A single node containing an argument structure (A, h) with no defeaters is by itself a dialectical 
tree for (A, h). This nade is also the root of the tree. 
2. Suppose that (A,h) is an argument structure with defeaters (A 1 ,h1 ), (A 2 ,h2), ... , (An,hn ). We 
construct the dialectical tree 1(A, h), by putting (A, h) as the root node oí 1(A, h) and by making 
this node the parent node oíthe roota otihe dialectical trees íor (A 1,h1), (A2 ,h2 ), . •• , (An,hn ). 
DEFINITION A.7 Let 1(A, h) be a dialectical tree for an argument structure (A, h). The nades oí 1(A, h) 
can be recursively labeled as undefeated nodes (U-nodes) and defeated nodes (D-nodes) as follows: 
1. Leaves of 1(A, h) are U-nodes. 
2. Let (8, q) be an inner nade of 1(A', h)' Then (8, q) will be an U-node iff every child of (8, q) is a 
D-node. (B, q) will be a D-node iff it has at least an U-node as a child. 
DEFINITION A.8 Let (A, h) be an argument structure, and let 1(A, h) be a dialectical tree. 13 We will say 
that A is a justification for h (or simply (A, h) is a justification) iff the root no de of 1(A, h) is an U-node. 
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